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ABSTRACT
Thispaper assesses the empirical relevance of "dynamic" factors
in industrialization in developing countries. Using data from a sample
of 91 firms, rates of growth of output per unit of input are calculated.
It is shown that there is little basis, at least with regard to Turkish
experience, to the notion that non—traditional industries are in some
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Are there dynamic factors in the growth of new industries? What is
learning by doing, and how important is it? How much truth is there to
the infant industry argument In any of its forms? What is the relationship
between the entry, growth, and efficiency of individual firms and that
of the industries to which they belong? How does that efficiency compare
with levels In other countries? What is the relationship between policy
measures, such as choice of trade policy and trade policy—instruments,
and rates of growth and of input and output?
These questions have been debated endlessly at an analytical level,
and yet final resolution of them hinges crucially on empirical analysis
of the orders of magnitude involved. For, the absence of externalities
can be proven only empirically. And, If there are externalitiesof the
type posited by defenders of "dynamic" arguments, not onlytheir existence
but also their magnitude is Important. It is the purpose of this paper
to provide some evidence, based on the experience of Turkish manufacturing
industry, on which to form a judgment as to quantitative answers tosome
of these questions. Naturally, it is hoped that similar researchfor other
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and Development Workshops at the University of Chicago made manyuseful com-
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of the author and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.2
countrieswill be spurred by our findings, and that the research represents
a first step toward a more general assessment of the relevant parameters.
A first section contains a brief outline of the issues and the analy-
tical debate. A second then covers some salient aspects of Turkey's econ-
omic development and import substitution policies as theyrelateto inter-
pretation of the results. The third section outlines the techniques of
measurement employed and the data used. The fourth section presents the
empirical findings. A final section assesses the results and sketches
some avenues for future research.
I. INFANT INDUSTRY ARGTJMENTS ANDTRADEPOLICY
In their quest to spur rapid economic growth, most developing coun-
tries have adopted policies generally termed "import substitution."
Details of policy instruments have varied, but a major thrust has been to
employ highly restrictive trade policy instruments designed to encourage
the development of domestic manufacturing industry.
Proponents of these policies generally concede that they are in
violation of the precepts of neoclassical economics in terms of efficient
resource allocation. Generally, however, it is contended that some sort
of"dynamic" effects are present that will permit more rapid long—run
growth ifthe short—run costs of starting these industries are borne.
Analysts have searched within the neoclassical framework for bases
on which such dynamic elements might exist, and most have been skeptical.1
1. See, for example, Baldwin's analysis of the circumstances under
which infant industry externalities might be present, and optimal policy
in those instances. See also Bhagwati, Ch. VII, for an emuneration of
other possible dynamic considerations favoring the development of new
industry through import substitution.3
Arrow's "Learning by Doing" provides one line of defense, although even
that argument, which hinges on cumulative output as the source of learning
experience, does not provide a rationale for favoring the development of
one industry over another without empirical evidence that learning might
be faster in the favored industry. Worse yet, if learning were industry
specific, learning by doing would provide at best an argument for selective
industrial development, rather than the across—the—board, destined—for—
the—domestic—market variety that has been associated with import substitution
policies. Indeed, industries that had learned would generally be expected
to become exporters.of their output, rather than to remain behind a wall
of tariff protection into the indefinite future.
It would appear that if there Is a dynamic argument, no matter what
its nature, it must somehow assert that industry (or firm) costs will
fall over time. That, In turn, can only happen if rates of growth of output
per unit of input associated with "infant" firms and industries are more
rapid than those associated with currently unprotected (and hence more
efficient in the economic sense) lines of activity.1 Evidence of such
higher growth rates would be necessary, but not sufficient, to provide a
defense for Import substitution, both because more rapid growth is not per
se evidence of actual overtaking either absolutely or In sufficient magnitude
1 Even then, for public policy to encourage such industries, it would
be necessary to stipulate a reason why such activltles were not privately
profitable.4
to repay foregone alternatives1 and because alternative policies might
generate the same sorts of growth performance without incurring the costs
associated with high rates of protection to sheltered domesticmarkets.2
It may also be noted that at constant international prices, increasing
output per unit of quantitative input in an activity is a necessary pre-
requisite for permitting rising real incomes to factors employed in that
activity, consistent with maintaining comparativeadvantage.3 Alternatively,
if factors in a particular industry are earning a normal rate of return,
the competitive position of the industry can improve (at constant prices)
only with increases in output per physical unit (1.e,, quality unadlusted)
of input. Thus, any "dynamic" shifts in comparative advantage (other than
those arising from changing factor endowments) would presumably be reflected
in rates of growth of output per unit of input above the rate of growth
of real factor payments.
In this paper, therefore, focus is upon output per unit of input
in various lines of endeavor in Turkish manufacturing industry and its
behavior over time. First, however, attention must be given to those aspects
of Turkish economic development and policies relevant for interpreting
the results.
1 The rate of growth of output per unit of input of the "infants" would
have to exceed rates in other sectors for a sufficiently long time for
overtaking to occur, and in addition, by an amount sufficient to repay
investment. That is, the foregone costs of undertaking the higher—cost
activity would have to yield at least as high a rate of return asalter-
native investments.
2 It can even be argued that sheltering domestic firms may reducetheir
incentives for efficiency by enough to offset, or even more than offset,the
potential learning gains. In that case, the dynamic argumentcould in prin-
ciple be correct, but false when carried out under restrictivetrade policies.
3 For the economy as a whole (given international prices or autarky),real
incomes to factors can rise only with growth of output per unitof input or
with the transfer of resources from less efficient to more efficient uses.5
II. IMPORT SUBSTITUTION IN TURKEY
Since tue 1930's, Turkey has generally followed a policy of protecting
domestic industry against foreign competition and of encouraging the development
of new industries.' In the period prior to World War II, the chief instrument
was the establishment of public enterprises which began producing a variety
of industrial products. Although public enterprises have continued to be
important within the manufacturing sector, their relative importance has
declined somewhat over time. Public sector enterprises accounted for 35
percent of value added in Turkish manufacturing industry in 1963 and or 31
percent by 1976.
After the Second World War, there was a period of rapid expansion which
lasted until about 1953, as prewar trade channels were reopened and foreign
assistance permitted an increased rate of investment. Thereafter, severe
foreign exchange difficulties led to high levels of protection and stringent
import licensing controls for the balance of the decade. This resulted in
large part from an inflation rate which exceeded 20 percent annually from
1955 to 1958 (at a fixed exchange rate), and partly for other reasons. From
1955 until about 1960, therefore, the domestic market was highly sheltered,
but it is arguable how much of the encouragement to new firms and industries
was deliberate, and how much was the side effect of measures intended to
protect the overvalued exchange rate and restrict imports.
1 For a more detailed account of Turkish policies affecting import
substitution in the industrial sector, see Krueger.6
After 1960, when a revolution overthrew the government and led to a
new constitution, planning was a key tenet of Turkish economic development.
In all the plans and programs, a major thrust has been that the industrial
sector was to play a "leading role," growing more rapidly than GNP as a
whole and absorbing immigrant labor from the rural sector. This was seen
to be especially important because of the prospective rapid growth of urban
population, both because of the outmigration from agriculture, and because
of Turkey's relatively high rate of population growth ——2.5percent annually,1
All Turkish plans based their programs for the Industrial sector upon
a general strategy of Import substitution. Although the degree of emphasis
placed upon encouraging domestic Industry has varied, and attention has been
given to some degree on occasion to encouraging the development of industrial
exports, the chief Incentives provided for the growth of the Industrial, and
especially the manufacturing, sector have been through the trade regimes.
Any firm or industry producing a product previously imported has been entitled
to approach the government and to request that imports in the future be
prohibited. This of course was tantamount to providing prohibitive levels of
protection automatically to any new industry. Such requests have generally
been granted, and in the event a firm's capacity appeared to be below the previous
import level, the item has been subject to import quotas in order to convey
protection to the industry. Firms promising to "save foreign exchange"
have received favored treatment in their applications for Import licenses
for investment goods and for subsidized credit,
1 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, some Turkish workers migrated to
work In Western Europe. However, the flow was regulated by the Turkish
government and, at the peak, not more than 5 percent of the Turkish labor
fOrce was employed abroad.7
Under these incentives, Turkish manufacturing industry's output grew
rapidly. Table 1 gives some indicator figures. As can be seen from the
fact that the share of manufacturing output and value added exceeded that
of GNP, although Turkey's overall growth rate averaged in excess of 6 per-
cent since 1960. For the period 1960 to 1965, the rate of growth of manu-
facturing output was 6.9 percent compared with growth of GNP of 4,5 percent.
While its comparative performance has slowed down somewhat, there can be
no doubt as to the manufacturing sector's role in the economy, and the
emp1aais given to it by Turkish policy. This is, among other things,
reflected by the fact that the share of manufacturing in total investment
always exceeded the share of manufacturing In GNP, and usually by sizable
amounts.
That the thrust of the growth of the manufacturing sector was oriented
toward Import substitution Is indicated by the increasing share of domestic
utilization of goods which was filled by domestic production. Thus, imports
of intermediate and investment goods are estimated to have constituted 21
and 80 percent respectively of total consumption in 1962; by 1977, the corre-
sponding figures were 18 and 48 percent of apparentconsumption.1
The trade regime has fluctuated in Its degree of restrictiveness over
the period since 1950. As already mentioned, the late 1940s and early 1950s
were a fairly liberal period, while the late 1950s were a period of increas-
ingly severe restrictiveness. After the devaluatIon of 1958 and a change in
governement In 1960, the regime was fairly liberal for a periodof several
years.
1 There has always been a considerable volumeof unrecorded trade in
consumer goods in Turkey, so thatofficial .figures mayoverstatethe degree
of import replacement.8
Table 1: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING SECTOR'S PERFORMANCE IN TURKEY
1960 1965 1970 1975
Share of Manufacturing
in GNP (percent) 13.9 15.6 16.3 17.0
Share of Manufacturing in
Total Investment (percent) 17 25 23
Share of Private Sector in
Manufacturing Value Added
(percent) 58 65 64 68
Average Annual Growth of
Manufacturing Value Added
(constant prices) 6.9 9.9 8.8
Average Annual Growth of
Real GNP 4.5 6.6 7.1
Share of Imports In Manu-
facturing Output (percent)
b 14.3 13.0 13.6 14.2
Consumer goods 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.1
Intermediate goods 211 16.5 14.3 17.7
Investment goods 80.5 69.7 66.4 48.5
Notes: a. Estimate Is for 1963.
b. Estimates are for 1962, 1967, 1972, and 1977.
Sources: State Institute of Statistics: 1) National Income Estimates;
2) Censuses and Annual Surveys of Manufacturing Industry.
3) E.Ozotun, Turkiyenin Gelir ye Istihdarn Dagilimindaki,
Yapisal Degisim (Structural Change intheDistribution of
Turkey's IncomeandEmployment). Ankara, 1979,andfrom
4) statePlanning Organization, Five Year Development Plans
and 1979AnnualProgram.9
By 1964, however, excess demand for foreign exchange began to emerge
and the response was to tighten import licensing. The regime became increas-
ingly restrictive in the late 1960s, culminating in 1969—70 when there
were long delays prior to receipt of foreign exchange even after licenses
were issued. After a devaluation in 1970, counterspeculative flows (especially
of workers' remittances from Western Europe) led to a period of about three
years of relatively liberal foreign exchange licensing. Starting with the
oil price increase of 1974, however, reserves were run down sharply, and
the system became increasingly restrictive up to the time of writing. An
interesting question, tackled below, is how these phases in the licensing
system have influenced the growth and efficiency of Turkish firms.
There are several hypotheses. First, it might be that all firms have
greater difficulty combining inputs efficiently in periods of import stringency.
In that case, one would observe a slowdown in the rate of growth of output
per unit of input across the board. Second, it might be that firms using
a relatively high fraction of imported intermediate goods were more adversely
affected by periods of foreign exchange difficulties than were firms relying
to a greater extent upon domestically—supplied materials. In that case,
there would be a differential slowdown, with firms more dependent upon
1
imports experiencing more difficulty.Finally, it is plausible that new
firms, starting during periods of import stringency, might behave differently
from firms established during periods of relative ease. On one hand, the
types of activities undertaken might be different, and on the other, the time
horizon might differ substantially. In that case, one might observedifferent
1 To be sure, government policies might discriminate among firms, buffering
some from the effects of reduced imports. This appears to have happened in
Turkey especially for some segments of the chemical industry (fertilizer,
insecticides, and pharmaceuticals). It has also been Turkish policy to
encourage the development of investment goods, virtually at any cost.10
behavior of growth of outputs per unit of input depending upon whether firms
were started during periods of import restrictiveness or of relative ease.
One final aspect of recent Turkish economic history deserves mention.
That has to do with the behavior of real wanes. Starting in the early 1960s,
various pressures, including a fairly liberal law protecting union rights
and minimum wage legislation, served to increase the real wage in the presence
of substantial urban unemployment. Table 2 gives data on the behavior of
the real wage in the period since 1963.1 As can be seen, it had more than
doubled by 1976. Simultaneously, inflation was accelerating in Turkey in
the late 1960s and l970s. Despite that, interest rates charged to industrial
borrowers (under credit rationing) hardly changed. As a consequence, the
increase in the real wage was less than the increase in the wage—rental ratio,
as the risIng rate of inflation implied a decreased cost ofborrowing.2 Hence,
there were strong incentives In the Turkish economy to economize on the use
of labor and to substitute capital for labor, insofar as capital goods
3 could be obtained.
1 There is reason to believe that the real wage was either stable or
rising only very slowly prior to that year.
2 The share of wages in the private manufacturing sector's domestic
value added rose from .301 in 1963 to .347 In 1977.
3 A high fraction of capital goods continue to be imported into Turkey,
especially after allowance Is made for construction activity as an investment
good (see Table 1). In addition to the above—mentioned factors affecting the
relative costs of hiring capital and labor, unions in Turkey became increasingly
militant in the 1970s, and employers had an incentive to substitute capital
for labor to avoid production stoppages and slowdowns and costly industrial
disputes.11
Table 2: NOMINAL WAGES, PRICES OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, AND
1963—1976
REAL WAGES
Notes: a.Average wage of workers covered by Social Insurance.
Data were interpolated for 1968—70.
Nominal Wagesa













































































III. DATA AND PROCEDURES
Two related sets of data form the empirical basis for the estimates.
The first set comes from the State Institute of Statistics which has taken
Censuses and Surveys of Industries starting in 1963. The latest year for
which their results are available is 1976. These sources contain data on
number of employees, wage bill, value of purchased inputs, value of output,
investments made by firms, and number of firms separately for public and
private activities within each industrial sector employing ten or more
employees. These data, combined with estimates of private and public sector
capital stock provided to us by the State Planning Organization and appro-
priate pricedeflators1 complete a data set from which it is possible to
infer the behavior of inputs and outputs for two—digit manufacturing indus-
tries in the private sector in Turkey.2
The second set of data originates from firms which received loans
from the Turkish Industrial Development Bank. For those firms, data
were available on a variety of their attributes (size, date of inception,
precise compositionof output, etc.) and also for annual investments,
annual labor force and wage bill, annual purchases of raw materials and
intermediate goods and inventory changes, sales, profits, depreciation,
and so on. Altogether, there are 91 firms for which data were available
1 Wholesale price indices were available for outputs of each two—digit
industry. These data were then used, in conjunction with the Turkish input—
output tables,to obtain a weighted input price foreach sector's purchases.
The same price deflators were used for two—digit industries and forthe firm
data described below.
2 In Krueger and Tuncer, the behavior of the private and public sectors
is analyzed and contrasted, and a fuller description of the data is given.13
on a reliable basis for a period of more than five years.' Since there
was credit rationing in Turkey, there is some presumption that borrowers
from the Industrial Development Bank were firms of above—average quality,
according to the criteria used by the Bank for its lending.
On the basis df these data, It was possible to compute an estimated
capital stock for each firm using perpetual inventory techniques. Doing
so was judged better than using balance sheet estimates (which were also
available) since the latter made no allowance for price level changes in
their capital stock in the context of a high rate of inflation as reflected
in Table 2. Depreciation rates were estimated from American engineering
data found in Park,2 and then scaled to equal the State Planning Organization's
estimate of the average rate for all manufacturing. Investment deflators
available from the State Planning Organization were first employed to convert
nominal investment into constant—price estimates of additions to capital
stock. Investment in a given year was treated as becoming effective capital
only at the beginning of the following year.3 Period t—l's capital stock
was depreciated, and then real Investment in t—l was added to obtain capital
stock in period t.
1 Interviews were held with more than a quarter of the firms, which
provided a check on the reliability of the data, and also provided additional
information on characteristics of firms and their management.
2 It is an interesting question whether one should a priori expect
depreciation rates to be lower or higher in Turkey than in the United
States. On one hand, cheaper labor should encourage more maintenance
and thus a longer economic life. On the other hand, poor and irregular
materials quality, irregular supplies of electric power, and workers with
less experience in the care of equipment might tend to the opposite result.
3 For some older firms, data were not available from inception. In
those cases, initial balance sheet data were converted to an estimate of
real capital stock based on knowledge of the firm's history and starting date.14
In addition, data from the firms could be directly used for the number
of workers. Purchased inputs, adjusted for inventory changes, weredeflated
to yield an estimate of material inputs. Finally, for some firms a physical
indicator of homogeneous output (e.g. tons of cement) was available andused
to indicate output. In others, it provedpreferable to take deflated
sales adjusted for inventory change as the measure of output.
Thus, for both firms and Industries, data were available on materials
inputs, outputs, labor inputs, and capital stock inputs, along with the
shares of the respective factors in the value of output. To estimate the
efficiency with which inputs were employed over time, an estimate was
derived of the rate of total factor productivity growth for each firm and
industry. An estimate of the total factor productivity growth canbe derived
as follows. Consider a production function for a particular industry or
sector i, with output denoted by X1. Let there be m productive inputs,
with the jth input Vj. Then the production function can be written,
(1) X1f
If we had full knowledge of all Inputs, in efficiency units, then changes




where f. is the partial derivative of the ith production function with
respect to the jth input. In fact, however, there is almost always aset
of unmeasured Inputs, and in addition, there may be technological change
in the industry. If it is Hicks—neutral, output at time tis
(2) X, A1f1(Vii ,...,V1 ••Vmj ) tt t t t
A.18 then the shift parameter for the ith industry capturing theeffects
on output of the measured inputs and any other unknownfactors contributing15
to productivity change. Define as the elasticity of output of I with
respect to inputs of factor j. Then one can totallydifferentiate (2),
and rearrange termssothat:
(3) dA1 dX1 dvii — dv11 dV
____— a!V1 aj V m Vmj
If the elasticity of output with respect to Inputs is constant over a
considerable range, the underlying production function must be of Cobb—
Douglas form, although that restriction is not necessary forshorter—run
analysis. In the short run, in a competitive environment where factors
are paid the value of their marginal products, the elasticityof output
with respect to a factor Input Is equal to the factor share in output.
One can, therefore, estimate total factor productivity growth, cIA/A, as
being equal to the growth of output less the weighted average rateof
the growth of identified inputs, where the weights are an index of each
factor in the value of total output.'
IV.RESULTS
Basic FIndIn
Table 3 presents some basic results of our estimates, giving rates
of growth of total factor productivity, output, capital, and labor, as
1 Using observed shares of factors in total productas weights Is
strictly valid only when factors are paidthe value of their marginal
product under competitive conditions.In practice, average returns to
capital (Interest plus profits) wereused to estimate capital's share,
because of the year—to—year volatility in profits.Likewise, It was
decided not to use Divisia indices of Inputs becauseof the extreme
volatility of shares from year to year. Rather, an averageshare for
three midpoint years was used in the computatIons.For a statement as
to why DivlsIa indices sould be used, seeNishimizu. In an experiment
covering 20 fIrms, the R between our Indexand a Divisia index exceeded
.95.16
Table 3: PRODUCTIVITY, OUTPUT, ANDINPUTGROWTH IN PRIVATE SECTOR
MANUFACTURING
(continuous annual percentage rates of growth)
Private TFPOutputCapitalLabor
All Manufacturing
Aggregate 1.84 13.5 15.9 7.6
Sample 1.91 11.1 13.1 6.2
Food Products
Aggregate .16 7.7 14.2 4.6
Sample .25 9.5 13.3 7.5
Textiles
Aggregate .84 11.0 13.3 4.6
Sample .72 10.2 14.1 6.2
Apparel and footwear
Aggregate 4.10 28.3 13.3 23.3
Sample 5.24 6.8 8,0 1.9
Wood and cork products
Aggregate —.55 12.6 14.2 10.0
Sample —3.34 15.8 27.9 9.1
Chemicals
Aggregate .46 15.1 15.4 8.4
Sample —.04 12.0 12.4 4.2
Nonmetallic minerals
Aggregate .72 15.3 16.7 8.0
Sample 1.61 7.4 7.4 5.0
Basic metals
Aggregate —.93 21.5 25.3 18.1
Sample 2.21 15.8 14.9 7.6
Metal products
Aggregate 1.61 11.8 13.1 7.8
Sample —.05 13.3 17.1 9.0
Electrical machinery
Aggregate 1.41 19.8 20.1 12.5
Sample 5.76 18.8 15.8 10.7
No sample data:
Beverages 5.31 22.5 14.2 18.0
Tobacco 5.97 5.7 —.3 —3.3
Furniture and fixtures —.56 6.6 14.2 4.7
Paper and products 1.55 23.7 26.0 16.7
Rubber products 4.27 16.8 13.3 5.1
Fur and leather products —1.17 8.6 17.0 7.8
Petroleum and coal products —8.80 33.7 60.5 28.1
Machinery except Electrical .62 17.9 17.6 15.2
Transport equipment .94 30.1 30.5 22.717
estimated from aggregate data and for the sample of 91 firms.1 Both
sets of estimates refer to private sector output only. The "aggregate"
estimates, i.e., those from the Survey of Industries and Census data,
cover the period 1963 to 1976, whereas the estimates for the private
sector firms cover the years for which data were available for each of
them, weighted by their respective sales sizes over the average of 1969
to 1971.2
There are a number of interesting questions about what the relation-
ship between firm and industry TFPG rates might be. A priori, there Is
no reason to expect that an industry's average growth rate will equal the
average of the rates of the firms in it, either for Inputs or for outputs.
Indeed, one would hope that firms with above average levels of economic
efficiency would expand more rapidly than average, while Inefficient
firms would drop out of the industry. There is also a question as to
the average efficiency level of new entrants to the industry contrasted
with the Industry's average economic efficiency level. If infant
industry proponents are correct in their view that there is an initial
period of inefficiency, this should show up in higher rates of growth
1 All estimated rates reported here and below are continuous annual
rates. They are computed by estimating trends rates of growth of capital,
labor, inputs, and output, from a logarithmic regression equation and then
calculating total factor productivity growth rates from the computed trends.
This procedure reduces the sensitivity of the estimates to fluctuations
in the initial and terminal years. Unless otherwise indicated, results
reported for the sample of firms pertain to output—weighted averages.
2 The estimates are made with these inputs: capital, labor, and
purchased raw materials and intermediate goods. It was deemed preferable
to estimate TFPG with respect to output In the Turkish economy, In part
because much of import substitution has centered on replacing imported
raw materials with domestic ones (generally of lower quality), and in part
because we had independent checks on our output data and not on value
added data.18
of total factor productivity for firms in new industries (at least after
fome initial period) than in older ones. If, on the other hand, firms
once in place may not alter the efficiency with which the produce (so that there
is no learning by doing), but instead 'embody" superior technology
in their capital stock, then, one should observe a pronounced differential
in rate of growth of factor productivity with industry rates of total
factor productivity growth well above the observed rates of the new firms
in the industry.1
The findings reported in Table 3 constitutea fairly substantial piece
ofevidencethat neither the infant industryhypothesis nor the capital
embodiment hypothesis seems to be valid, at least in the Turkish context.
In most sectors, productivity growth in firms is close to, or below, the
industry rate. Even in sectors where the total factor productivity growth
was higher in the sample than for the two—digit industry aggregate, output
growth rates for the sample were below the corresponding figures for the
aggregate industry, thus suggesting that new firms were not increasing
their share of industry output.
A second notable feature of the results reported in Table 3 is the
relatively low level of total factory productivity growth for Turkish
private manufacturing. The average continuous rate of 1.84 percent is
1 One problem, of course, is that there is no basis on which to
judge the degree to which the sample of firms that we have is repre-
sentative of new entrants in those industries. They were all supported
by the Industrial Development Bank, which is charged with encouraging
new projects, and for that reason, there is some presumption that the
firms represent a better than average set of new entrants to Turkish
industry. In some instances, the Industrial Development Bank financed
a new project of an existing firm. Even in those instances, however,
the projects financed by the Bank represented a sizable fraction of the
firm's output, and could, in that sense, be regarded as representing
new activity in the industry in question.19
considerably below estimated rates of 3.5 percent annually (forNorway),1
3.66 percent annually (for Japan),2 and 2.1 percent annually (for the U.S.).3
Any hope of "closing the gap" between the developed and developing countries
must surely be ephemeral as long as numbers such as these represent relative
performance, regardless of what it Is that total factor productivity growth
estimates are really measuring.
Third, the data do not provide any support for the notion that Import
substitution Industries, while less efficient than their counterparts in
developed countries, will eventually "catch up." Among the industries on
which emphasis has been placed in Turkey were chemicals, basic metals, paper
and paper products, metal products, machinery, and electrical machinery. In
most of these sectors, Import subsitutlon was well under way by the late
1960's. None of these sectors experienced a rate of growth of total factor
productivity even equaling the Turkish manufacturing average in the aggregate.
For the firms in the sample, only electrical machinery surpassed the average
for all firms.
A fourth feature Is the virtually—universal finding that firms were
expanding their capital stock much more rapidly than they were increasing
4
their number of employees.Of the 91 firms, only 14 increased their labor
force proportionately more than they Increased their their capital stock,
while six firms decreased their labor force absolutely while increasing output.
1 See Ringstad, page 139.
2 See Nishimizu and Hulten —otherestimates for Japan give even higher
rates. See their Table 4.
3 See Kendrick, Table 3.
4 The labor share was nonetheless rising both for firms and for the
aggregate, as was mentioned above. In light of the fact that the relative
cost of employing labor more than doubled, it is remarkable that the labor
share rose only from .311 to .347 —anincrease of 15 percent.20
As can be seen from Table 3, for all private Turkish firms, the rate of
increase in employment was 7.6 percent, compared to an increase in output
of 13.5 percent and an increase in capital services of 159 percent. For
the sample of firms, the rate of growth of capital stack was more than
twice that of employment. To be sure, increasing output per man is highly
desirable, but not when it comes about through substitution of capital for
labor while individuals remain employed in pursuits with substantially
lower marginal products. There seems to be a little dQubt that Turkish
industry, almost sector by sector and firm by firm, has substituted capital
for labor to a considerable extent in response to the rising relative cost
of employing labor compared to using the services of capital.
Reasons for Low Productivity Growth
These findings raise more questions than they answer. If indeed
Turkish performance was so poor, why was it poor? What accounts for the
results? One set of estimates for a particular country cannot yield enough
data for definitive analysis. Until much more is learned about patterns
of total factor productivity growth across countries and industries, any
analysis must remain suggestive. Nonetheless, the findings for Turkey are
broadly consistent with several hypotheses that have been put forth in the
trade and development literature.
One plausible hypothesis, to which the data lend some support, is
that it is the policies adopted under an import substitution strategy which
have led to the relatively poor perfroznance of Turkish manufacturing industry.
In particular, high levels of protection have tended to give individual
producers relatively secure shares of the domestic market, and few incentives
to attempt o reduce costs, Rewards have been for producing at all costs,
rather than for minimizing costs of production. Regulations governing21
conditions of production have also tended to discourage many attempts at
efficiency.
The data from our sample can never substantiate this hypothesis,
but they may go some way toward it. There are several pieces of evidence:
1) analysis of TFPG of firms by year of entry reveals an interesting
correlation between their performance and the economic conditions obtaining
at the time they entered; 2) the overall rates of TFPG across firms vary
quite markedly with the state of the trade an4 payments regime over time;
3) data on rates of productivity growth by size of firm do not suggest
any tendency for efficiency gains to be related to increased shares; 4) there
is a very low correlation between TFPG and profit rates; and 5) observed
relative price behavior in Turkey suggests that the link between domestic
and international price movements was very weak.
Table 4 gives the rates of growth of total factor productivity, output,
and capital and labor inputs for firms classified according to the date
at which they were founded. These dates are, to be sure, sometimes somewhat
misleading as some old family firms shifted production Into modern, import
substitution lines under the same name, but that appears to have been the
exception rather thali the rule. As can be seen, there were 16 firms founded
before 1950. Their output—weighted average total factor productivity growth
rate was 4.57 percent over the period it was measured (which never started
before 1955 and often did not start until 1960). Firms started in the periods
of severe import restriction, 1955 to 1959 and 1965 to 1969, have generally
been poor performers; the 1965—69 group had negative total factor productivity
growth on average, and the group ten years older experienced TFPG of less
than one percent. Thus, the notion set forth in Section II, that periods22
ofimport stringency mayencouragethe emergence of a different type of
entrepreneur than firms started during the more liberal periods, gets some
support from the Turkish data.
Table4: STARTING DATE OF FIRM, OUTPUT, INPUT, AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
(continuous annual rates)
Date finn started; No. ofFirms Mea'Median OutputCapital Labor
Before 1950 16 4.57 1.32 8.55 8.97 1.79
1950 to 1954 13 1.46 1.88 997 16.14 5.26
1955 to 1959 22 .81 1.58 9.37 12.56 5.25
1960 to 1964 20 266 2.16 16.44 10.06 16.51
1965 to 1969 17 —1.01 .18 9.81 12.79 9.78
Note: Data are output—weighted averages. The age of one firm was unknown,
and only two firma were started after 1969.
The second piece of evidence, namely the fluctuation in total factor
productivity growth with the restrictiveness of the trade regime, is at best
suggestive. As mentioned above, the estimates are sensitive to choice
of initial and terminal years, a problem that can be resolved by use of
estimated trends when considering a sizable number of years. When moving
to consideration of shorter time periods, time trends become lessmeaningful,
and initial and terminal points must be used, with the greater volatility
they give to the estimates. The best that can be done is to compute rates
from pairs of moving averages, taking three—year periods. These are given,
for output—weighted and simple averages of the data, for all the firms in the
sample and for the f inns in three specific industries, for the yearsfrom
1957—60 onward in Table 51
1 Thus, the rate given for 1957—60 refers to the rate computed from
the average of 1957—59 and 1958—60. Patterns for other sectors are not
dissimilar to those presented in Table 5. They are not presented due
to space limitations, although it should also be noted that, with a few
exceptions, the numberof firmsdrops off sharply in some sectors, especially



































































































































Note: TFPG ratios for the three sectors are output—weighted
ratios for individual firms in the period indicated.
averages of
Table 5:TYPO OVER TIME
23
A.All Firms
1957—60 1 —7.25 1 —2.59 0 ———
1958—61 1 —7.69 1 1.22 0 ———
1959—62 1—11.53 1 1.01 0 ———
1960—63 1 4.04 1 —6.44 1 32.59
1961—64 4 5.78 2 13.64 1 9.92
1962—65 4 7.75 2 27.79 2 5.5724
The rapid total factor productivity growth in the early l960s is
readily evident in both the weighted and the unweighted averages for all
firms and for the three individual secotors indicated in the table. The
decline in productivity growth in the late l960s, the period when foreign
exchange licenses became scarce, is also apparent. It should be observed
that the performance in the late 1960s was not dissimilar to that in the
late 1950s ——bothperiods of extreme difficulty for firms attempting to
obtain permits to import raw materials, intermediate goods, and spare parts.
It may also be noted that, in addition to exhibiting fluctuations in
productivity growth rates which seem to coincide with phases of the foreign
exchange cycle, there appears to be something of a deceleration in the rate
of total factor productivity growth, with a higher average rate in the early
1960s than in the late 1960a, and, after an initial burst in the early 1970s,
further deceleration. This may be attributed to the "exhaustion of easy
import substitution," or to other phenomena.1
Yet a third piece of evidence comes from examination of the pattern
of total factor productivity growth related to the size of firms. Table 6
gives the data. For total factor productivity and for output, average
annual continuous rates of growth are given as a simple average and weighted
by individual firms' outputs. There does not appear to have been a
significant difference between simple and output—weighted ratesof total
factor productivity growth. In general, one would expect that, in a
1 It was mentioned above that import—dependent firms might experience
more of a slowdown in productivity growth than less import—usingfirms.
Our data were inconclusive on this point, with some tendency in that direction
for 1967—70, but less so for 1973—76. The possibility of selective treat-
ment of individual Industries may account for this, or it may be thatthe
effects of restrictive import licensing are all_pervasive.25
Table 6: SIZE, TFP AND OUTPUT GROWTH
(average annual continuous rates)
Size of Firm Total Factor Productivity Growth Output Growth Rate
(IIofemployees) Simple AverageOutput Weighted Simple AverageOutput Weighted
10—50 .92 —.29 12.38 11.65
51—100 .57 —4.83 8.98 2.13
101—150 .91 .78 11.29 11.51
151—200 2.61 .18 13.82 12.98
201—250 .77 1.27 11.47 11.14
251—500 4.31 10.11 17.49 16.91
501—800 2.34 4.59 11.34 9.48
Over 800 .56 .76 9.35 10.29
Total Sample 1.62 1.91 11.98 11.1326
competitive environment firms with higher rates of total factor productivity
growth would expand their output more rapidly than firms with slower total
factor productivity gro'wth) This, too, does not appear to have happened
with any regularity. Large firms experienced relatively slow productivity
growth, and yet output from that group grew at a weighted rate of 10 percent
annually, which was slightly above the rate of growth of output for firms
in the 500—800 employee size group.
The pattern that emerges from all of the above would seem to suggest
little correlation between rates of growth of output per unit of input
and other variables. One hypothesis is that the failure of these relation-
ships to hold is attributable to the lack of incentive for increasing
efficiency within the Turkish context, relative to the incentive for in-
creasing output, virtually "at all costs" (given the protected environment
in which firms were producing and the generally excess—demand nature of
the economy). Some corroboration for this hypothesis is given by a simple
regression estimate, of the form:
a+a1 TG+a2
where P/K is the average rate of profit per unit of capital employed by
the firm, TG is the computed rate of total factor productivity growth,
and dQ/Q is the rate of growth of output of the firm. If incentives in
Turkey are for entrepreneurs to concentrate their efforts on increasing
1 Each firm is classified in one size category, based on its number
of employees in 1969—1970. Therefore, entry of smaller firms into new
size categories is not a factor biasing these results.27
outputrather than for reducing costs,' this should be reflected by a
positive coefficient for a2 and a negative one (or at least one substan—
tially smaller in value) for a1. The estimated regression is:
P/K =.315—l.996TG+ 2.11 dQ/Q R2 =.39
(.96) (.55)
The elasticity of profits with respect to the output growth rate at the
mean was .45, while the elasticity of profits with respect to total
factor productivity growth was —.25.
The final piece of evidence concerns the behavior of relative prices
in Turkey and abroad. In a competitive market, with international prices
given and liberalized trade, domestic prices of outputs of different coin—
modities would not alter. In a closed economy, however, when firms have
monopoly power, one would expect that there would be some relationship
between rates of total factor productivity growth and rates of (relative)
price increase.
Table 7 gives the data. For sectors for which American and Turkish
price indexes were available and approximately comparable, ratios were
taken of the relative price increases between Turkey and the United States
over the period from 1963—69 (during which time the exchange rate vls—a—vis
the dollar and the TL was fixed) and for the period 1971—76 (during which
1 It can, of course, be argued that there are always incentives for
doing both. A difficulty is that there re constraints on availability
of import licenses, credit, and other resources within Turkey. Insofar
as available resources are allocated to cost reductions, as for example
by importing different machinery, they may be diverted from output in-
creases. The same may be true for managerial time. Some interviewees
claimed that they had not paid any attention to increasing productivity
at least until very recently. One firm with a relatively poor record
of productivity growth indicated In interview that, after 1976 it was
decided that output would not expand for a while, so attention should
shiftto reducing costs. The result was a small increase in output,
sale of several parts of the plant and equipment, andareduction in
halfof the workforce, with a 20 percent reduction in energy inputs and
materials savings.28































































































period the exchange rate depreciated from TL 15 par dollar in 1970 to
TL 16.7 per dollar in 1976). Ratios of the rates of price increase In
the U.S. and in Turkey are given in the first and third columns. For
nonmetallic minerals, for example, the American price rose by 10.9 per-
cent from 1963 to 1969, while the Turkish price index rose 25.9 percent.
Thus, in 1969, the Turkish price of nonmetallic minerals was 13 percent
higher, relative to the American price, than it had been in 1963.1
Although western European countries are at least as Important as the
United States in Turkey's trade, it is likely that American and European
prices of tradables move fairly closely together, and that taking American
prices does not introduce significant distortions into the comparison.
As can be seen, there was considerable relative price fluctuation between
the two countries, attesting to the fact that the trade regime effectively
closes off the economy from international relative price movements.
Moreover, inspection of rates of total factor productivity growth
indicate that there has not, In general, been a very close link between
domesticprice behavior and rates of total factor productivity growth.
Thus, transport equipment bad a relatively high rate of increase of
outputper unit of input In thel970a, but its domesticrelative priee
increased sharply compared to the international price. Only for rubber
products does ahigh rate of total factor productivity growth appear to
havebeen accompanied by a pronounced decline Inthe relative price in
Turkey.
1 The year 1970 is not included because that was a year of devaluation
and relative price realignment in the Turkish economy.30
None of these pieces of evidence in themselves constitutes proof that
the low rate of total factor productivity growth in Turkish manufacturing
was associated with the incentives provided by the trade and payments regime.
They are, however, strongly suggestive of that conclusion.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Estimating total factor productivity growth for firms and industries
provides a useful tool for analyzing some aspects of the economic growth
of developing sountries. Certainly, increasing outputs per unit of
(physical, quality unadjusted) input offers hope of "closing the gap" and
increasing real incomes that is not feasible in its absence. However, the
relationships between micro and macroeconomic aspects of total factor pro-
ductivity growth are not sufficiently well understood for any firm conclu-
sions to be drawn about overall economic growth until much further work is
undertaken.
For Turkish manufacturing, however, the estimates presented in this
paper provide some fairly compelling evidence that the dynamic arguments
used in support of the Turkish import substitution strategy have not in
fact had an identifiable empirical basis. Whether the alleged dynamic
component is a result of externalities, economies to scale, indivisibilities,
improved quality of the labor force, learning by doing, or other phenomena
it should be reflected increased output per unit of input, a phenomenon
that has happened more slowly in Turkish manufacturing than in those indus-
trialized countries for which estimates are available.
A final word of caution is dn order, however. Much as increasing out-
put per unit of input is undoubtedly desirable, proof that productivityis
ri8ing is not per se evidence that the activity in question is economic.31
Indeed, as we have shown elsewhere (Krueger and Tuncer), output per unit
of input appears to have increased somewhat faster in TurktIhpublic enter—
prises in the manufacturing sector than in private firms, and yet there is
every evidence that inputs per unit of output are substantially higher in
the public sector.
The obvious policy conclusion is that total factor productivity growth
for Turkish manufacturing would have been higher if public sector enterprises
(with more rapid growth) had grown more slowly and the private sector more
rapidly: shifting resources to more efficient uses may increase output per
unit of input more rapidly than increasing output per unit of input within
activities. Obviously, an optimal set of economic policies achieves equal
efficiency in all cases and simultaneously encourages rapid growth of factor
productivity.32
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